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COMMENT
A RESPONSE TO THE CONFERENCE
OF STATE CHIEF JUSTICES *
WiLUAm B. LociHART t
My assignment is to appraise the Supreme Court's role in recent
times in the area of federal-state relations. I have decided to center
my attention on the criticism leveled at the Court by the Conference
of State Chief Justices last summer.
We can ignore today's emotional and colorful attacks on the Court.
Their irrationality destroys their effectiveness. But when the Chief
Justices of the State Courts by a vote of thirty-six to eight indict the
Supreme Court for failure to exercise "proper judicial restraint" that
indictment requires careful examination.
The danger is that an indictment of this kind, coming from a
responsible source like the Conference of Chief Justices, tends among
the uninformed and irresponsible to be taken as proof of guilt.
What, then, is the indictment?
In the conclusion of their report the Chief Justices deplore what
they call "an accelerating trend toward increasing power of the National Government and corresponding contracted power of the State
governments." They recognize that with a developing country and
changing conditions there will always be problems of allocating power
between national and state governments, as matters once mainly of
local concern become matters of national concern, and they recognize
that the Supreme Court is given power to determine such questions.
They point out that the degree of friction that develops in effecting
changes depends upon the wisdom of those empowered to alter the
boundaries and upon the speed with which changes are made. The
Chief Justices then build up to their indictment by saying: "The overall
tendency of decisions of the Supreme Court has been to press the
extension of federal power and to press it rapidly." Then comes the
indictment:
"We believe the Supreme Court too often has tended to adopt
the role of policy maker without proper judicial restraint. We
• An address made as a panel member at the Association of American Law
Schools meeting in Chicago, Dec. 28, 1958.
t Dean and Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
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feel this is particularly the case in both of the great fields we have
discussed-namely, the extent and extension of the federal power,
and the supervision of State action by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
My concern is with the indictment that the Supreme Court has
"too often" acted "without proper judicial restraint" in the federalstate relations area. In my opinion, this indictment is not justified as
applied to the "modern" Supreme Court toward which this criticism
was directed. This criticism might properly have been directed to the
pre-1937 Court, but not to the Court after 1937.
Let us consider briefly the first area mentioned by the Chief
Justices--extent and extension of federal powers. In this area has
the court of the past twenty years adopted the role of policy-maker
without proper judicial restraint?
There are two divisions in this area: The first relates to the expanding scope of the national powers themselves under congressional
legislation; the second, to the restrictions or limitations upon state
power arising out of the existence or exercise of national powers.
In the first division the Court has exercised extreme self-restraint.
There is no need to spell this out. We all know that for the past twenty
years the Court has permitted Congress to make its own policy in
expanding the national power, whether under the commerce clause or
under the power to tax and spend for the "general welfare" or other
clauses. The Court has refrained from interfering as Congress has
moved the national government into areas formerly the exclusive
domain of the states.
The Chief Justices deplore the rapid expansion of national powers,
but they are either criticizing the wrong agency or seeking the wrong
remedy. Congress is the agency that has expanded the national powers,
and the Court has practiced judicial restraint in leaving these policy
determinations to Congress. If the Chief Justices want the Court to
check this legislative expansion of federal powers, the Court must
exercise less judicial restraint, not more.
In only one respect can it fairly be said that the Court has on its
own authority expanded national powers. This is in its interpretation
of vague statutory phrases, such as "affecting commerce" in the National Labor Relations Act, where Congress sought to go as far as the
Court would find constitutional power. Here the Court could possibly
have adopted a more restricted view of national power without thwarting clearly expressed congressional intent. Yet Congress wanted the
regulations to extend as far as was constitutionally proper, and there is
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no basis for concluding that the Court has carried national power in
these areas beyond that contemplated or desired by Congress. Congress
is still the basic policy-maker in determining the scope of national
power, and has shown no inclination to draw back its regulations in
these areas where it used vague phrases for the very purpose of going as
far as possible. I think of only one exception, the Southeastern Underwriters case, where the Court's 1943 application of the antitrust laws to
insurance was later, in effect, reversed by Congress. Here greater selfrestraint, with a more thoughtful appraisal of the possible implications
of the decision on state regulatory power, might have avoided an
unhappy episode.
But these illustrations of expansion by the Court's interpretation
of vague statutory phrases are peripheral to the main thrust of expanding national power. That thrust came from Congress, with strong
public support; and even Mr. Justice Roberts, after retirement, said
that the Court could not have resisted it.
In the second division relating to restrictions or limitations on
state power arising out of national power, dormant or exercised, the
over-all movement of the modem Court has been toward increasing, not
decreasing, state power. Let us glance briefly at the major areas
involved.
In intergovernmental immunities the Court has moved toward
greater and greater freedom of taxation, both by the states and by the
federal government. It has removed this major obstacle to state taxation 'at least when the immediate taxpayer is a private person, not the
federal government itself. Here is an expanding area of judicial restraint, leaving the determination of the tax burden to the political
processes. The Court is faced with tougher problems when state
regulation has an impact on federal agencies, but in recent years the
Court has interfered with state regulation of this nature only when it
was found inconsistent with actual federal legislation. On some of
these cases there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion, but in
my opinion these cases cannot be criticized as demonstrating a lack of
judicial self-restraint. Indeed, they are not so criticized by the Chief
Justices.
In state taxation of interstate commerce the modern Court has
shown more and more liberality toward state taxing power. The Court
has given increasing recognition to the state need for tax revenue from
interstate business, and has sustained many taxes that would have been
held invalid prior to 1937. In some cases the Court has stricken down
state taxes on what seem to me purely formal grounds, where I would
have sustained the taxes as involving no real threat to interstate com-

1959]

A RESPONSE TO THE STATE CHIEF JUSTICES

merce. Yet this is a difficult field in which the arbiter of our federal
system has to weigh many considerations, and I do not believe that the
Court can be accused of any lack of appropriate self-restraint in this
difficult area. Today there is substantially greater freedom to impose
taxes on interstate business than twenty years ago, and the report of the
Chief Justices recognized this increasing liberality toward state taxation
of interstate commerce.
Similarly, there is less interference in recent times with state
regulation of interstate commerce, absent any federal legislation. Increasingly, the Court gives careful consideration and appropriate weight
to the state interest sought to be protected by the regulation, though it
has not hesitated within the past twenty years to hold invalid state
regulation that it considered unreasonably harmful to the national interest in a free commerce. This is its function and duty as the arbiter
of the federal system. I think it significant that the Chief Justices
aimed no criticism at the Court in connection with cases of this kind.
Similarly, in other areas, the Court has given greater effect, not
less effect, to state power during the past twenty years. The Chief
Justices recognize this by referring to Erie v. Tompkins establishing
the reign of the state common law in federal courts in diversity
cases, and by noting the Supreme Court's relaxation of its due process
rules with respect to in personam jurisdiction in state courts.
Actually, when you reduce the Chief Justices' report to specifics
rather than generalities, in only one area is the report critical of actual
Supreme Court decisions dealing with restrictions on state power
arising out of national powers, as distinct from fourteenth amendment
restrictions. This is in the pre-emption doctrine decisions.
The report refers to two lines of pre-emption cases: (1) the Nelson
case in which the Court held that federal legislation dealing with
subversive activity pre-empted the field and excluded state statutes
forbidding subversive conduct against the United States Government,
and (2) the cases dealing with the effect of the National Labor Relations Act on state jurisdiction to deal with labor relations in industries
subject to the national act. The Court cannot justly be accused of lack
of proper judicial restraint in either of these areas.
Personally, I think the Supreme Court was right when it affirmed
the four to one decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the
Nelson case. I do not propose to discuss the decision, though I suggest
a reading of the defense of the decision at the Conference of Chief
Justices by Chief Justice Jones of Pennsylvania. It is enough to say
that this was a difficult and close problem in an emotionally charged
area, where the Court was bound to be criticized if it agreed with the
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state court that the state was without power to deal with subversion
against the United States. Six of the nine justices were firmly persuaded that state meddling in this delicate and difficult area was inconsistent with nationally established programs for dealing with this
national problem, which only the national government could adequately
handle. Appropriate self-restraint does not require the Court to
abdicate its responsibility in such a case, particularly when Congress
can remedy the decision quickly if it disagrees.
The labor relations decisions in which the Court has sought to steer
a workable line between national and state jurisdiction reveal a careful
and studied effort to leave to the states as much jurisdiction as possible
without interfering with the congressional plan of regulation. There
is nothing lighthearted about the way the Court has struggled with the
various aspects of this difficult problem. Had the Court been inclined
to cut out for itself an easier task it could have taken the extreme
position that Congress has pre-empted the entire field of labor relations
affecting interstate commerce. This would have been easy for the
Court to administer, but it would have disregarded important state
interests. Instead, in my opinion the Court has acted very responsibly
to protect state interests in this area, and has brought upon itself
many headaches in the process. Of course, I do not agree with all of
its decisions in this area, for they are difficult ones on which the most
conscientious persons can reasonably differ. For example, I thought
the Guss decision unnecessarily created a no-man's land, an unfortunate
result not compelled by the act. But good lawyers disagree with me
on that case. Viewing this whole line of cases, I am satisfied that the
Court cannot justly be accused of lack of proper judicial restraint or a
tendency to over-extend federal power in disregard of state interests.
Indeed, the report of the Chief Justices appears to recognize that the
principal cause of difficulty in this area has been the failure of Congress
to provide guidance, rather than a lighthearted exercise of policy-making
by the Court.
Summarizing my views on the first count of the indictment, I
suggest that the Report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1955 presents a far more accurate picture of the impact of
Supreme Court decisions on the powers of local self-government than
does the Chief Justices' report. The conclusions in chapter one of the
Commission's report remain accurate in 1958: I mention two:
(1) Limitations on state power arising out of national powers
have "only a minimal effect on the capacity of states to discharge their
functions." The "trend of judicial opinion outside the civil liberties
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field has on the whole been tolerant and accommodating to state policy."
The "range of activities that lie primarily within the power of the
States by reason of lack of any coercive authority in Congress to deal
with them is substantial."
(2) The basic problems of maintaining our federal system today
lie in those areas of national and state power where both Congress and
the states have real choices to make, and where many alternative courses
are open. It is in these areas that practical issues arise, and the legislatures and administrative agencies with their assigned jurisdictions
provide the appropriate forums for settling these issues. The current
judicial doctrine leaves these issues to be resolved by legislative judgment. They are no longer issues resolved by the Court applying legal
criteria but by the legislative bodies, operating within their respective
jurisdictions, applying political, economic, and administrative criteria.
This has been the consequence of Supreme Court decisions over
the past twenty years. To me this is judicial self-restraint. It may be
excessive self-restraint in the eyes of some, but it cannot properly be
called lack of proper judicial restraint.
The second count of the indictment is that the Supreme Court
has tended to adopt the role of policy-maker without proper judicial
restraint in its supervision of state action by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment.
Most of us would, I think, agree that the verdict would have to
be "guilty" here were we judging the period from 1900 to 1937. During
that period the Supreme Court repeatedly substituted its policy judgment for that of the state legislatures on the wisdom and desirability of
economic and social legislation. But that is all ancient history. At
least with respect to social and economic legislation the Supreme Court
of the past twenty years must be acquitted of this charge. The modem
Supreme Court has been extremely careful not to substitute its judgment
of what is wise or sound for state legislative judgment in social and
economic legislation. The same cannot be said of a number of the
state courts represented by the Chief Justices who voted to indict the
Supreme Court for lack of proper judicial restraint.
Only in two areas has the Supreme Court used the fourteenth
amendment to supervise state action to any extent in the past twenty
years. In these two areas there has been a considerable degree of
interference with state policies-in civil liberties and criminal procedure.
In both areas the Supreme Court has exercised a considerable
measure of affirmative leadership. There has been less self-restraint
here than in other areas and for that the Court is to be commended, not
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condemned. Here is where fundamental rights of the individual to
equality under the law, to freedom of expression, and to fair procedures
come into conflict with governmental power. Since judicial restraint on
most matters of legislative policy has allowed a very broad sweep to
governmental power, it is appropriate and necessary that the Court
give increasing attention to insuring that these broad governmental
powers are exercised in such a way as to respect the basic constitutional
rights of individuals. It is safe to give broad sweep to legislative
powers only if an independent judiciary will assert itself to protect the
rights of individuals and minorities. A high degree of self-restraint
here would be an abdication of the Court's major responsibility.'
Turning now to state criminal procedure the Court has been unusually careful to exercise a reasonable measure of self-restraint. It
has deliberately left to each state a great deal of freedom to work out
its own criminal procedure, so long as the most basic rights are not
denied. Repeatedly, the Court has refused to impose upon the states
procedural standards that the Court has found essential to fair administration of justice in the federal courts.
This does not mean that the Court has not interfered with state
criminal procedure. It has on a good many occasions, and in some
closely divided cases, like the recent Griffith decision criticized by the
Chief Justices. But the division in Griffith did not relate to the desirability of a procedure requiring the state to pay for a transcript when
needed to perfect an indigent's appeal. All agreed this was desirable;
their division related to whether this procedure was sufficiently fundamental to justify imposing the procedure on the state. In other words,
the Griffith case itself demonstrates the Justices' constant concern with
maintaining a proper balance between insuring fair procedures and
leaving with the states independent responsibility for developing their
own procedures. The many decisions in which the Court has resolved
a difficult question in favor of the state demonstrate to me an unusual
forbearance and judicial restraint in this area. Indeed, on a number of
occasions the Court has allowed state procedure to stand that I personally would have held to violate due process-for example, its refusal
to require counsel for indigents in non-capital cases.
I, for one, believe there is a real need and place for the discreet
exercise of power in the Supreme Court to enforce fair standards of
criminal procedure in state courts. I recommend the lecture by Justice
Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court on Federalismand State Criminal Procedure,published in the November 1956 issue of HarvardLaw
1. Here Dean Lockhart commented that the civil liberties aspect of the problem
would be discussed by another panel member.
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Review. He makes a very strong case for control over state criminal
procedure by the United States Supreme Court. In addition to certain
practical considerations that give to the Supreme Court a better perspective than the state courts, Justice Schaefer emphasizes that:
"Considerations of federalism .

.

. must be measured against

the competing demands arising out of the relations of the United
States to the rest of the world. The quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in enforcement
of its criminal law. That measurement is not taken merely in
retrospect by social historians of the future. It is taken from day
to day by the peoples of the world, and to them the criminal procedure sanctioned by any of our states is the procedure sanctioned
by the United States."
Apart from the real need for some federal control over minimum
procedural protections, it should not be overlooked that these procedural
standards do not curtail the substantive legislative power of the state.
The state still has the power to deal with its problems, but is simply
required to do so by procedures that insure adequate safeguards to
protect the rights of individuals.
My conclusion then is that in this broad field of federal-state
relations the Supreme Court has acted in a very responsible manner
in the past twenty years. Its record simply does not support the
accusation by the Chief Justices that it has "too often" acted "without
proper judicial restraint" in this area. In view of the pressures under
which the Court operates, with a heavy case-load and far less time to
study the cases than we on the sidelines have to examine them critically,
there are bound to be occasional cases where we may believe the Court
has not given careful enough consideration to the problem and should,
perhaps, have exercised greater judicial restraint before taking action.
But its record as a whole does not support the broadside type of attack
made by the Chief Justices.
This does not mean that the Chief Justices' comments can be lightly
brushed aside. Even though their conclusions are not well supported by
a fair examination of the Court's actual performance, there is significance in the fact that the vast majority of the state Chief Justices gave
their support to this report. This indicates a rather widespread opinion
in judicial circles, both North and South, that there is need to urge the
Supreme Court to exercise greater discretion and self-restraint in its
policy-making roles in our federal system. So widespread an opinion
cannot be wholly ignored by the Supreme Court Justices. While I
think the report went too far when it accused the Court of "too often"
adopting the "role of policy maker without proper judicial restraint,"
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we cannot quarrel with emphasis in the report on the need for "careful
moderation" and restraint in the exercise of the Court's policy-making
role. I think all of the Justices appreciate this need for moderation
and restraint, but there may be some value in a forceful reminder
from such a representative group of the judiciary in this country.
Still, I would not like to see this report cause any major change
in the course of decisions by the Court. In my opinion we are now
going through one of the great periods in the history of the Supreme
Court. Today the rights of the individual are in the ascendency.
Today the Court is giving greater protection than ever before to basic
individual liberties, and to procedures that protect the individual's
rights. At the same time, the Court is throwing no road blocks in the
way of governmental action designed to benefit the individual. When
history writes its record of this period, my opinion is that the storm
now raging around the Supreme Court will be only one little skirmish
in an era in which the Supreme Court will emerge as one of the key
factors in the creation of a better American democracy.

